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INTRODUCTION 
The Statement of Issues presente nn appeal 
Statement of the Case, the Statement .:• i ? ne Facts, and the 
brief and require no supplementation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CKLDIBLE EVIDENCE OF 
EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS DURING THE DECEASED 
EMPLOYEE'S PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT WI*n- TUT 
AGAINST WHOM THE AWARD WAS MADE. 
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Defendants respond to plaintiffs1 first point regarding 
the lack of evidence of Mr. Werner's exposure to asbestos at 
Tisco between 1977 and 1982 by focusing on the tactual 
testimony of Mrs. Werner, Mr. Collins, and Mr. Kinder. 
Defendants contend the testimony of these witnesses shows 
some exposure to asbestos during Mr. Werner's employment at 
TISCO. However, it is clear from the hearing transcript 
that these witnesses gave no testimony to support a finding 
regarding asbestos exposure at TISCO. 
Mrs. Werner testified that she did not have complete 
knowledge of the types of insulation products handled by 
TISCO; but, she did state that the insulation was not 
asbestos-based. (R. 29) Both Mr. Collins and Mr. Kinder 
testified that, in 1970 or 1971, the Federal Government 
banned the use of asbestos in insulation products. 
(R. 50 Sc 74) Mr. Kinder stated asbestos was very rarely 
used in insulation after the ban. (R. 74) Mr. Collins 
added that some asbestos-based material, including transit 
pipe, was manufactured after the ban. (R. 50) However, 
Mr. Collins testified he had no knowledge whether Mr. Werner 
used asbestos-based transit pipe at TISCO Intermountain. 
(R. 53) 
Thus, none of the witnesses who appeared at the hearing 
on this matter testified that Mr. Werner was exposed to 
asbestos during his employment with TISCO. Furthermore, the 
defendants apparently concede that the offer of proof, 
concerning the expected testimony of a witness who did not 
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appear, made by counsel for Mrs. Werner, was incompetent 
evidence unable to support the award. 
Finally, Mrs. Werner's attorney recognized at hearing 
the weakness of any claim that Mr. Werner was exposed to 
asbestos during his employment from 1977 to 1982 at TISCO. 
Specifically, counsel for the widow states, 
... I submit that after a review of both the 
testimony of Mrs. Werner and talking to the son 
and these two gentlemen here [Joseph J. Collins 
and Darrell Kinder], as well as Dave McOmie, that 
the possibilities of exposure to harmful 
quantities was practically nil as far as TISCO 
was concerned ... (R. 54) 
Given the total lack of evidence of any exposure to 
asbestos during Mr. Wernerfs employment at TISCO Intermountain, 
the Industrial Commission's award of benefits against TISCO 
should be reversed. 
POINT II 
ASSUMING THERE WAS EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS DURING 
THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE'S EMPLOYMENT WITH HIS 
EMPLOYER, BENEFITS WERE AWARDED BASED ON 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT SUCH AN EXPOSURE WAS 
INJURIOUS. 
Defendants respond to plaintiffs' second point 
regarding the insufficiency of evidence that Mr. Werner's 
alleged exposure to asbestos while at TISCO was not 
injurious, by contending any exposure is injurious. 
Initially, defendants state that the terms 
"harmful" or "injurious exposure to the hazards of 
employment" have not been addressed in opinions issued by 
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this Court. Such a statement is in error. This Court 
considered the question of what constitutes sufficient 
injurious exposure to an occupational disease in Uta-Carbon 
Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 567, 140 P.2d 
649 (1943). Concerning alleged silicosis, the Court said 
that there was no legislative definition as to what were 
harmful quantities of silicone dioxide dust. The Court then 
laid down the following guidelines, 
In the absence of legislative or medical 
standards, in order to give effect to the Act, 
the commission must determine what are harmful 
amounts of silicon dioxide dust from the facts 
of each individual case. 
140 P. 2d at 651 
Thus, legislative or medical standards of injurious exposure 
must be considered, if available. Then, the facts of the 
case may be applied. However, no matter what standard is 
used, the statutory requirements of direct and proximate 
causation set forth in Utah Code Anno., Sections 35-2-26 and 
35-2-27(28) must be met in terms of the last injurious 
exposure. 
Recently, in Chadwick v. Industrial Commission, 572 
P.2d 400 (1977), this Court applied medical as well as 
factual evidence to rule on the compensability of an 
allegedly injurious occupational exposure causing an eye 
infection. Analyzing the injurious nature of the exposure 
in terms of causation, this Court noted that it was the 
claimant's burden of proof to establish that there was a 
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direct causal connection between employment conditions and 
the alleged occupational disease and, further, that the 
employment was the proximate cause of the disease. The 
Court pointed out that the right to an occupational disease 
award is created by statute and is dependent upon meeting 
the requisites of the Occupational Disease Act. Turning to 
the claimant's argument, therein, that there was a 
comparatively high risk of contracting the alleged 
occupational disease through employment, this Court 
indicated in Chadwick, 
... the mere fact that it [the disease] 
could have come from that source [employment] 
or even that there is some likelihood that it 
did so, does not compel a finding that that 
was the fact. 
582 P.2d at 402 
Based on the foregoing, Mrs. Wernerfs contention 
that any exposure could be harmful is without merit. The 
treatise cited by the Medical Panel indicates there is still 
"consistent evidence11 that a very brief asbestos exposure 
does not necessarily cause a substantial risk of 
mesothelioma. (R. 153) Thus, given equivocal medical 
evidence, if only a brief exposure to asbestos is proved 
between 1977 and 1982, arguably, Mrs. Werner has presented, 
at best, the same modicum of evidence showing a 
"comparatively high risk11 of disease that was found 
insufficient in the Chadwick case. Mr. Wernerfs exposure to 
asbestos between 1977 and 1982 was not proved to be of a 
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length or degree that could have actually caused 
mesothelioma. This argument is buttressed by the Medical 
Panel Report which, in the plaintiffs1 view, stands for the 
proposition that Mr. Werner's exposure to asbestos between 
1947 and 1967 was the main cause of his methothelioma; and, 
further, in terms of reasonable medical probability, Mr. 
Werner's alleged exposure to asbestos at TISCO was not a 
substantially contributing cause of his mesothelioma as 
continuous exposure to asbestos greater than twenty years, 
after 1967 herein, would not increase the risk of 
development of malignant mesothelioma. (R. 155, 156) 
Absent proof of injurious exposure and causation, 
an award against TISCO cannot be supported. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER 
DEFENDANTS1 CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS AS 
DEFENDANTS RAISE SUCH ISSUES FOR THE FIRST 
TIME IN THEIR BRIEF HAVING FAILED TO FILE A 
MOTION FOR REVIEW OR CROSS-APPEAL. 
In the defendant's brief, a third point is raised 
challenging the constitutionality of Utah Code Anno., Section 
35-2-13 and Section 35-2-14, on the grounds that these 
sections allegedly deny Mrs. Werner access to a forum to hear 
and determine her rights guaranteed under the provisions of 
Article 1, Section 11 and Article 16, Section 5 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
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The thrust of defendants f argument is that the 
statutes of repose, which bar a claim for benefits against 
Mr. Werner's prior employers, are unconstitutional because 
they purport to deprive a worker of a cause of action before 
it actually arises. In this regard, the Administrative Law 
Judge specifically found that a claim against Mr. Werner's 
next prior employer, Mountain States Insulation, was not 
actionable pursuant to Utah Code Anno. 35-2-13(b) (4) because 
more than three years had elapsed between the date when 
Mr. Werner last worked for Mountain States Insulation, 1976, 
and the date of his dependent's occupational disease claim. 
(R. 163) Unfortunately, Mrs. Werner never filed a motion 
for review challenging the administrative law judge's denial 
of her claim against Mountain States Insulation, nor did she 
file a cross-appeal in this Court from the Industrial 
Commission's final order. No one has suggested that there 
is any limitations problem with Mrs. Werner's claim against 
TISCO, which claim is the subject of this appeal. 
Therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider 
defendants' argument that the statutes of repose, which the 
administrative law judge relied upon in denying benefits 
against the prior employer, are unconstitutional. 
Considering briefly the merits of their argument, 
defendants characterize Utah Code Anno., Section 35-2-13 and 
Section 35-2-14, as "statutes of repose" which mandated the 
filing of an occupational disease death claim, in this 
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instance, before the dependent's cause of action arose. 
Specifically, defendants state that, if the "last injurious 
exposure11 were in 1967, Mrs. Wernerfs occupational disease 
death claim would have to have been filed no later than 
1970. Such a contention is in error, not only regarding the 
characterization of the named statutes as unconstitutional, 
but, also in stating the time frame which, under the facts 
of this case, a claim would have to be filed. 
The code sections cited by defendants are not 
unconstitutional as the two-part test of a valid statute of 
repose announced by this Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 25 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (1985) is met. That two-part 
test indicates, 
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law 
provides an injured person an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy ,!by due course 
of law11 for vindication of his constitutional 
interest. The benefit provided by the 
substitute must be substantially equal in 
value or other benefit to the remedy 
abrogated in providing essentially comparable 
substantive protection to one's person, 
property, or reputation, although the form of 
the substitute remedy may be different. ... 
Second, if there is no substitute or 
alternative remedy provided, abrogation of 
the remedy may be justified only if there is 
a clear social or economic evil to be 
eliminated and the elimination of a remedy is 
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for 
achieving the objective. 
Analyzing the first prong of the test, it is 
evident that the Occupational Disease Act is constitutional, 
vis a vis, Article 1, Section 11, as no common law right 
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existed for a cause of action based on an occupational 
disease. As Arthur Larson indicates in his treatise on 
workmenfs compensation, 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Desk 
Edition, Sec. 41.20, p. 7-87, 
... the concept of occupational disease was a 
stranger to the precompensation-era common 
law. To the extent that compensation acts were 
thought of as substituting nonfault liability 
for the kind of injuries that were potential 
subject of fault liability, there was thought 
to be no place for occupational diseases, which 
(in the sense of a disease due to the ,fnormaln 
conditions of the industry as distinguished 
from the negligence of the employer) had 
consistently been held incapable of supporting 
a common-law action. 
Thus, it is clear that the legislature did not fail 
in providing a substitute remedy, in the form of the 
Occupational Disease Act, which was substantially equal in 
value to a remedy abrogated. No remedy was abrogated. A 
no-fault system of compensating workers was established 
where no avenue of recovery existed before. 
Moving to the second prong of the test, no analysis 
is necessary as no prior remedy has been abrogated. 
However, compelling arguments can be put forward regarding 
the social and economic justification of the Occupational 
Disease Act. As noted by this Court in Masich v. United 
States Smelting, Refining and Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 
191 P.2d 612, 624-625 (1948), certain individual rights and 
remedies can be made to yield to the public good, 
The humanitarian principles of the occupational 
disease act do overcome in part, the inadequacy 
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of relief at common law tor a class of 
employees, and the act should not be discarded 
because some members of the class have rights, 
which may be adversely affected. 
It should be remembered that our act is a 
compulsory act and should be considered in the 
light of the principle that the employer is 
charged with liability regardless of fault ... 
We are convinced the legislature, because of 
the nature of the disease [silicosis], the 
length of time for development, the difficulty 
of proof, the inability to properly apportion 
the negligence between employers, the cost and 
expense of litigation and the small return to 
the employee, decided to deal with silicosis 
through the commission and to require both the 
employer and the employee to shoulder part ot 
the costs of occupational disease without 
regard to the negligence of either. 
This court cannot ignore or strike down an act 
because it is either wise or unwise. The 
wisdom or lack of wisdom is for the legislature 
to determine. If the act is unjust, amendments 
to correct the inequities should be made by the 
legislature and not by judicial interpretation. 
Obviously, in creating the Occupational Disease 
Act, the legislature exercised its police power, as in the 
workmen's compensation area. By contesting Sections 13 and 
14 of the Act, defendants are in truth seeking to broaden, 
through judicial interpretation, the employer's liability 
for compensation and encroach upon the conditions where the 
legislature intended no payments be made. The legislative 
formula giving rise to compensation should not be changed 
through such a process. Rather, as suggested in Masich, 
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the benefit structure of the Occupational Disease Act should 
be altered only by the legislature. 
Turning to defendants1 analysis of when 
Mrs. Werner's claim had to be filed herein, defendants 
indicate, assuming there to be a last injurious exposure to 
asbestos in 1967, 1970 was the latest a claim could be 
filed. This is in error. 
Utah Code Anno. Section 35-2-13(b)(4) provides that 
no compensation shall be paid for death from an occupational 
disease unless death results within three years from the 
last date upon which the employee actually worked for the 
employer against whom compensation is claimed. Mr. Werner 
went to work for Mountain States Insulation in approximately 
1965 or 1966 as an insulation mechanic. (R. 27) 
Mr. Werner stayed with Mountain States Insulation until 1977 
when he formed his own company, TISCO Intermountain. 
(R. 28) Assuming Mr. Werner's last injurious exposure was 
in 1967, the facts of this case support a valid occupational 
disease claim against Mountain States Insulation until 
approximately 1980, three years after Mr. Werner left his 
employment with the company. Two points must be made. 
First, a compensable occupational disease death 
claim is not possible under the facts of this case against 
Mountain States Insulation since Mr. Werner's onset of 
mesothelioma was in 1982. But, second, considering 
Mr. Werner's work history and the medical evidence in the 
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record, a compensable occupational disease death claim 
involving Mr. Werner could, in all probability, have 
occurred under Utah law. Mr. Werner started working in the 
asbestos insulation industry in 1947. (R. 28) Assuming 
injurious exposure to asbestos from 1947 to 1967, Mr. Werner 
was at risk to develop mesothelioma, according to the 
Medical Panel Report, from 15 to 50 years after his first 
injurious exposure. (R. 155) Given the first injurious 
exposure in 1947, the minimum latency period would put the 
initial risk of developing mesothelioma 15 years later or in 
1962. Arguably, because of the possibility of longer 
latency or because of continued exposure until 1967, 
Mr. Werner remained at risk of developing a malignant 
mesothelioma from 1962 until 1982. Applying Utah law to 
this scenario, Mr. Werner had viable occupational disease 
coverage regardless of fault, for 18 of the 20 years he was 
at risk of developing mesothelioma. Had his mesothelioma 
developed between 1962 and 1980, Mr. Werner could have 
successfully claimed benefits against Bullough's Insulation, 
Owens Corning Insulation, and Mountain States Insulation. 
The system of occupational disease compensation established 
by the legislature did fail to extend coverage for 
Mr. Werner's death, but, pursuant to Masich, the system need 
not be perfect. Substantial coverage was extended. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no evidence before this Court that 
Mr. Werner was exposed to any asbestos during his employment 
with TISCO Intermountain. Absent such evidence, Mr. Werner 
could not have been harmfully exposed to asbestos during 
such employment and there would be no possiblity of an 
occupational disease death claim against said employer. 
Given this lack of evidence, the Utah Supreme Court need not 
consider any other issues raised by plaintiffs or 
defendants. The Industrial Commission's award of death 
benefits against TISCO should be reversed. 
If Mr. Werner was exposed to some small amounts of 
asbestos during his employment with TISCO, as alleged by the 
defendants, there was no proof that such an exposure was 
injurious and causative. Without this type of evidence, an 
award against TISCO cannot be supported and must be 
reversed. 
This Court does not have jurisdiction in this 
appeal to consider defendants1 constitutional arguments. 
These arguments were raised by the defendants for the first 
time in their brief. Defendants failed to perfect these 
issues for appeal by filing a motion for review before the 
Industrial Commission or a cross-appeal before this Court. 
DATED, this xt '* day of m ^ ^ u , 1986. 
DENNIS V. LLOYD ( 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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